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This is indeed quite an honor to be here and talk to you today. The
panelists we have heard from so far are great resources of information and they
have provided objective comments as to the optimal standards with regards to
my area of specialty in Baghdad: the reconstitution of the Iraqi criminal courts.
It is humbling, quite frankly, to speak after the former Chief of Staff of the
Army, General Eric Shinseki. I only hope that the information I am about to
provide you is not a lull in the day, but rather a continuation of the momentum
that I have been handed by the panelists and General Shinseki.
I also want to encourage each and every single one of you who is interested
in practicing internationally. It is a very rewarding field regardless of what
area you pursue, whether it is as a JAG officer, a public international attorney
with the federal government, a member of Human Rights Watch, or whether
you decide to work in the private sector. You will be richly rewarded in
whatever commodity you seek, whether it is materialistic or altruistic. More
importantly, our nation, at this time especially, needs its best and brightest to
be engaged in these international endeavors.
In order to talk intelligently about what it was really like on the ground in
Baghdad in April 2003, you have to talk about the legal context and how Iraqi
law works on a theoretical level. When I initially deployed to Kuwait in
February 2003, 1 was on the international law team for V Corps, which was the
U.S. land component command for land forces engaged in Operation Iraqi
Freedom. Part of the JAG responsibility was planning. At the Corps level, we
were strenuously working with issues relevant to post-major combat
operations, especially the legal obligations that are triggered upon military
1 Address given at the Georgia Journal oflnternational and Comparative Law's conference
of April 16,2004, "From Autocracy to Democracy: The Effort to Establish Market Democracies
in Iraq and Afghanistan." The original remarks have been edited for content and length.
Footnotes have been added by the speaker and Journal staff.
* Judge Advocate, U.S. Army. In April 2004, assigned to International and Operational Law
Division, Office of the Staff Judge Advocate (OSJA), V Corps, Heidelberg, Germany. J.D.,
Northwestern School of Law at Lewis and Clark College, 1998; B.S., University of Maryland,
summa cum laude, 1995. Deployed in support of peration Iraqi Freedom with OSJA, V Corps
from Feb. 2003 to Dec. 2003. For more information on the topics discussed in following
address, please contact the author through the Oregon State Bar, at http://www.osbar.org.
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
occupation.' That is not to say that we had all the information we wanted or
needed, the amount of support we would have preferred, or the required
amount of time to get a perfectly coherent and detailed plan together.
Nevertheless, the Hague Regulations, in Article 43, states "The authority of the
legitimate power having in fact passed into hands of the occupant, the latter
should take all the measures in his power to restore and ensure, as far as
possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely
prevented, the laws in force in the country."2
In modem terminology, we strove for a "safe and secure environment."3
Part of a safe and secure environment requires that we create the mechanism
by which the laws of the country can remain in force and the officials of that
country can govern their own citizens. The Iraqis know their customs and their
laws a lot better than we do. There are going to be persons, groups, and
officials that we rely upon, within the parameters of human rights and
international law, to carry out the normal functions they had in the previous
regime, or as they might under a non-oppressive government. The Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
Article 64, says that penal laws shall remain in force and the tribunals of
occupied territories shall remain functional.4
Obviously, we had a lot to learn about the Iraqi criminal system. Thank-
fully, a fair amount of open-source work had accumulated prior to 1991.
"Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the
hostile army. The occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been
established and can be exercised." Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War
on Land and its Annex, Regulators Respecting the Laws and Customs of War of Land, Oct. 18,
1907, art. 42, 36 Stat. 2277, 2306 [hereinafter Hague Regulations]. "Military occupation is a
question of fact," and it "must be both actual and effective." THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE,
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FELD MANuAL 27-10, at 139 (1956).
2 Hague Regulations, supra note 1, art. 43.
The term "safe and secure environment" can be a legal standard or a military objective.
See, e.g., The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dec. 14,
1995, Bosn. & Herz.-Croat.-Yugo., Annex 11, art. I(1), 35 I.L.M. 149, 150 (providing a legal
standard for "safe and secure environment" in Bosnia and Herzegovina); News Release, United
States Central Command, Coalition and Iraqi Police Work to Make Iraq Secure (May 18,2003),
http://www.centcom.mili/CENTCOMNews-Release.asp?NewsRelease=20030562.txt
(describing the Coalition's efforts to create a secure environment in Iraq). Once Coalition forces
"occupied" belligerent territory in Iraq, the term "safe and secure environment" most accurately
denotes a binding military objective vis-A-vis the body of international obligations that attach
upon "occupation."
' Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug.
12, 1949, art. 64, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
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However, after 1991, the contemporary information about the Iraqi criminal
system was a vine of knowledge that withered until there was no more
transparency and very little reliability in the information. So we only knew
how it ought to have run. We had very little information about how, in fact,
it was running. For example, we knew the jurisdictional outlay of the courts
of the country. We knew Baghdad had two appellate courts, divided by the
Tigris River into a west jurisdiction and an east jurisdiction. There were five
felony courts. We knew how judges were assigned. We knew how prosecu-
tors were assigned to their posts. We knew that defense counsel was supposed
to play a role. But we did not know in fact what role defense counsel were
playing. We also did not know what records were kept. Would they have
records on normal felony courts? Would there be records of the infamous
security courts or military courts, those secret courts that were held in camera
against people for political crimes? Would Coalition forces be able to go into
a prison suspected of holding political prisoners and discern from the records
who were political prisoners or who were felons? This became extremely
complicated and somewhat of a moot point as Saddam released 38,000 people
under general amnesty on October 21, 2002.'
As far as the criminal justice system in Iraq, in March 2003 we knew it was
supposed to run according to a civil law system based upon a French model as
codified by the Iraqi Penal Code of 1969 and that criminal procedure was
pursuant to the Criminal Procedure Code of 1972. What we did not know was
how these laws were in fact followed.
So, when a person was arrested during Saddam's regime, what role did the
police have? How was evidence collected? Under Iraqi procedure, investiga-
tive judges monitor, almost like a grandjury, the investigation and the progress
of the case. A criminal investigator is assigned by the investigative judge to
question the accused. The judge subsequently conducts an investigative
hearing to review the evidence and, if warranted, questions the accused.
However, under Iraqi law the accused does not have a right to remain silent
or a right to an attorney during the investigation phase as those accused of
criminal misconduct under U.S. law would. Does this mean Iraqi practice
violates international norms of due process? If not, would Iraqi adherence to
In March 2003 it was still not generally known how many prisoners in fact were released
and whether any of the detention centers still held political prisoners. Later news sources cited
the number of released prisoners at close to 100,000. See, e.g., Scheherezade Faramarzi,
Saddam 's Amnesty Blamedfor Iraq"s Crime, ASSOCIATED PRESS ONLINE, May 16,2003, 2003
WL 55372506. Later, Coalition Provisional Authority Ministry of Justice personnel revised the
number to 38,000.
2004]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
traditional practice violate American norms and principles, therefore
potentially exposing U.S. civilian and military leaders administering the affairs
of Iraq to domestic liability? Remember, some of the Coalition nations are
civil law systems that themselves may not recognize the right against self-
incrimination.
This issue was subsequently resolved in June 2003 when Ambassador Paul
Bremer, Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), issued
CPA Order Number 7 that, among other things, suspended political crimes and
at the same time gave additional due process rights to the accused.6 As a
consequence, Iraqis were given the right to an attorney at the investigative
phase. This order also gave them the right against self-incrimination. This is
a clash between something we brought in and what their historic law said. As
a matter of practice, the investigator, under the guidance of an investigative
judge, would interview the accused and if the accused did not cooperate, that
could be considered by the judge in sentencing or as a matter of guilt or
innocence.
When those kinds of changes are brought into a system (and I am not saying
they are wrong), there are ripple effects. For example, what is the legal
consequence if an accused does not have an attorney assigned upon question-
ing by an investigator? Due to the situation in Baghdad for most of 2003,
access to defense counsel was sporadic during the investigation phase except
for the most serious offenses. Iraqi criminal procedure does not have evidence
motion practice like American jurisprudence. From the date of the investiga-
tion hearing until the case referral to the criminal court judge, there is no pre-
trial conference for the prosecution and defense to appear in front of the judge.
Thus, the accused have no opportunity to petition to suppress confessions
based upon a theory of lack of adequate legal representation.
Do the CPA orders create this motion practice? If not, how does the
respective appellate court rule on a conviction when there has been an
investigative interview without a notice of a right to representation? Of
course, this presumes the lack of notice was documented to begin with. What
do the appellate courts consider since their appellate system is a documentary
review of the case and does not have oral arguments? The appeals court
reviews are legal reviews and not a review of the facts. Since there is not a de
6 Penal Code, Ord. No. 7, Coalition Provisional Authority, CPA/ORD/9 June 2003/07
(2003). An order for amendments to the Iraqi Criminal Procedure Code was issued contempora-
neously. See Criminal Procedures, Mem. No. 3 (revised), Coalition Provisional Authority,
CPA/MEM/27 June 2004/03 (2004).
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novo review of the facts, does the lack of representation during an investigative
hearing automatically mean that the case is remanded, or can the appeals court
consider the fact in order to reduce punishment?
As Professor Brooks mentioned, the Iraqis are extremely proud of their
legal system.7 At our first meeting with Iraqi judicial officials, at AI-Bayaa'
Civil Court in late April 2003, their top priority was to reinforce the-idea that
Iraq had a good legal structure that was based on a system prior to the rise of
Saddam Hussein and that it was the same model, more or less, as practiced by
civil law countries in Europe. So while most of the legal profession agreed
with the suspension of political offenses, they were resistant to any change in
their procedural law.
However, when talking about an endeavor the magnitude of the reconstruc-
tion of courts in a city of five million inhabitants on the brink of a power
vacuum due to a collapse of its government, it takes time to get through the
details and to come up with a plan that is based on fact and not necessarily
based on your perception of what the system is like. In the meantime, there is
an obligation to provide a safe and secure environment, which also means
protecting the individual rights of those accused of criminal acts to the extent
practical under the circumstances. Therefore, instituting an order guaranteeing
the individual rights for a defendant, if nothing else, places Iraqi judicial
authorities on notice of raised procedural expectations, even if the details and
consequences have to be resolved at a later time.
From March until April 2003, the Coalition wrestled with these tensions:
theory and practice; speculation and fact; assumptions and knowledge. What
I have not talked about yet is the unknown or unforeseeable, such as the
situation the Coalition inherited in Baghdad in April of 2003. While looting
and lawlessness is a foreseeable consequence of a collapsing totalitarian
government, the magnitude of the wholesale looting and mass destruction of
governmental property is incomprehensible until one sees the nature of the
damage firsthand. Ninety percent of the criminal courts in Iraq suffered
damage to some extent or another.8 In Baghdad, most criminal courts suffered
catastrophic destruction.
Within the first forty-eight hours that we were in Baghdad, Colonel Marc
Warren reorganized his legal staff into a team tasked with assisting in the
7 Scott Carlson, Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks& MariamNawabi, Panel 1: Establishing theRule
of Law, 33 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 119, 130 (2004).
' This statistic was determined by Coalition Provisional Authority Ministry of Justice staff
after reviewing court assessments from different judicial assessment teams throughout Iraq.
2004]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
reconstruction of the criminal courts in Baghdad. This team was called the
Judicial Reconstruction Assistance Team, or JRAT. 9 Our legal team
immediately went to see firsthand the damage of the Al-Karkh court complex,
which was at the time still smoldering. The records had been torn out of the
cabinets, thrown on the floor in big heaps, and burned. Exposed to the
elements in the courtyard, there were felony case files that were still somewhat
preserved. All of the furniture was stolen. All the wiring for the fixtures, from
the walls to the sockets, was looted. There was nothing left but a concrete
shell. Unfortunately, many of the governmental buildings suffered similarly.
However, there were two criminal courts that were saved due to quick
action by some of the residents of the district where the courts were located:
Al-Bayaa' and Ad-Adhamiya. The residents personally secured the buildings
and protected them from the mobs. In one court, the senior judge had bricked
up the entrance in March 2003, when it was apparent to him that the court
would not be opening again until after the war.
These two courts were of incalculable importance, allowing the Coalition
to get the criminal justice system restarted in May 2003. The first meeting
between senior CPA personnel, the JRAT, and Iraqi judicial officials occurred
in late April 2003 at the Al-Bayaa' civil court complex."° The purpose of the
meeting was to conduct a firsthand inspection of a court that survived looting
and destruction. Word spread that Coalition personnel were going to visit the
court, so the Coalition was received by approximately 150 Iraqis standing
outside the court wanting to know when the courts were going to get back up
and running again. The crowd consisted of Iraqi Ministry of Justice employ-
ees, as well as members of the community. On that particular day, the Al-
9 The JRAT is a non-doctrinal legal team organized to assist the civilian authorities in the
CPA with the reconstruction of the criminal courts in Baghdad. In June 2003, the CPA Ministry
of Justice delegated all responsibilities for managing the Baghdad criminal court to the JRAT
while retaining oversight. The original JRAT consisted of Colonel Marc Warren, Lieutenant
Colonel Jeffery Nance, Captain Travis Hall, Captain Ryan Dowdy, Specialist Mark Abueg, and
Specialist Anthony LaVine. In June 2003, the JRAT was reorganized into a four-person team:
Major Craig Jacobsen, Captain Travis Hall, Specialist Jimmy Kang, and Specialist Anthony
LaVine. From August 2003 to December 2003, Major Juan Pyfrom replaced Major Jacobsen
until the JRAT dissolved on December 31,2003.
to As a point of clarification, there are two AI-Bayaa' court complexes and both were
preserved. One is the civil courthouse and the second is the criminal courthouse. Due to
security reasons, most Coalition-Iraqi meetings as well as the earliest criminal proceedings
occurred at the civil court, and not at the criminal court. In July 2003, the Al-Bayaa' Criminal
Court resumed operations.
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Bayaa' district courthouse was a very sentimental and symbolic image for the
people.
They wanted to see the court up and running again because Iraqis wanted
what anyone would under similar circumstances-they wanted to have some
semblance of a return to normalcy. People that worked at the court wanted
income. They had not been paid since February so they expected us to give
them their jobs back so they could have salaries with which they could buy
food, cooking gas, and other necessities. They wanted their neighborhoods
safe and they wanted criminals off the streets. We had the same experience
with residents several days later on the east side of the river at the Ad-
Adhamiya court
The Iraqi Ministry of Justice officials and the judiciary from the two
appellate jurisdictions wanted to immediately remove the criminal elements
from the streets. Not only were they professionally concerned for the safety
of their fellow citizens and property, but they also were personally concerned
about their own safety since many of the criminals were people they convicted
previously that had been released under Saddam's general amnesty. To these
ends, the Iraqi officials had a hierarchy of needs: they wanted salaries and to
be paid retroactively; they wanted supplies; they wanted surviving buildings
to be protected continuously by Coalition troops; they wanted an investment
of funds to rebuild the other courts; and they wanted their court police officials
to be issued Kalashnikovs and themselves to be issued handguns. These were
all demands placed on the senior CPA-Ministry of Justice representatives
during the first week of daily meetings in both appellate jurisdictions.
On May 7, 2003, the AI-Bayaa' and Ad-Adhamiya courts officially opened
for business and held the first criminal investigation hearings in post-Saddam
Baghdad." The next day, the JRAT team dispersed funds from the CPA
Minister of Justice to the Iraqi Ministry of Justice employees in Baghdad for
emergency payments until their salaries could be repaid. This was only two
weeks from the date that our team arrived in Baghdad, and a scant ten days
from the arrival of CPA officials. I assert that this was a very short window
of time. Thus, I disagree with those that say there was a missed window of
opportunity. To the contrary, Colonel Marc Warren and Clint Williamson 2 of
" Louis Meixler, Iraqi Courts Get Back to Work, ASSOCIATED PRESS ONLINE, May 9,2003,
2003 WL 20008859.
12 John C. "Clint" Williamson of the National Security Council acted as Senior Advisor to
the Ministry of Justice from April 2003 to June 2003. John C. Williamson, Establishing Rule
of Law in Post- War Iraq: Rebuilding the Justice System, 33 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 229, 229
(2004).
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the CPA Ministry of Justice jumped right in and got things running with
amazing speed and energy.
One of the aspects of this that I have glossed over is that criminal courts
never operate in a vacuum. A criminal justice system needs a police force that
is willing to make arrests, investigate crimes, collect evidence, and transport
prisoners. There must be pre-trial detention facilities to hold those accused of
serious offenses and there must be confinement facilities to place prisoners in
if they are convicted. Those are the basics.
The same day the JRAT visited the smoldering Al-Karkh court complex in
west Baghdad, we also went across the Tigris to visit the Baghdad Police
Academy. At the time it was the only known operating police precinct in
Baghdad. Overseeing the precinct's operations was a U.S. Army Civil Affairs
officer and roughly a dozen Iraqi police officers that had returned voluntarily
to help protect the Police Academy compound from destruction. Upon arriving
at the Academy, we learned the Iraqi police were holding a small number of
persons suspected of criminal misconduct during the fall of Baghdad to
Coalition forces. We reported this information to Mr. Williamson.
Prior to May 7, 2003 and the opening of the courts, the JRAT escorted Mr.
Williamson to the Baghdad Police Academy in order to talk to Lieutenant
General Ameer of the Baghdad Police in an effort to coordinate Iraqi police
and judicial assets for the presentation of preliminary cases to the Iraqi
investigative courts at Al-Bayaa' and Ad-Adhamiya. General Ameer had
preliminary case files on some of the detainees so these persons were
earmarked to be transferred by the Iraqi police to the respective open courts to
appear for investigative hearings.
At this time, it was the understanding of the Coalition that the Iraqi
Ministry of Justice and the Iraqi Ministry of Interior, to which the Iraqi police
belong administratively, would be working closely together in order to start
transporting prisoners, to preserve evidence, and to help establish the rule of
law in the city. In retrospect, that was premature. As it turned out, the system
stalled because we were not actively, on a daily basis, engaging with these
courts and specifically making sure that they had momentum. On May 27,
2003 the Baltimore Sun quoted Chief Judge Kasim Ayosh of Ad-Adhamiya as
saying, "There are terrible crimes being committed out there, and the city is
insecure. Yet the courtrooms are empty."1 3
13 Peter Hermann, Semblance of Justice Returning to Baghdad, BALT. SUN, May 27, 2003,
at Al.
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What we learned, as Colonel Marc Warren would often illustrate, is that
criminal justice is a three-legged stool comprised of the courts, the police, and
the prisons. Too much stress on any one of the legs would collapse the entire
system.
Therefore, the JRAT and CPA could not focus on reconstituting the courts
without worrying about the impact of police or prisons. As I mentioned, in
April the Police Academy was the only known functioning police precinct.
There are nearly fifty-five police precincts in Baghdad, and most suffered the
same level of destruction as the criminal courts. Even though police officers
began to report back to work in small numbers, of those, few had uniforms,
weapons, or radios.14
Yet, despite the flurry in May 2003 to place returning police on patrols and
to hire even more police, it is one thing to say you should put police back in
the streets-it is something different to drive around in the capital of a country
you were just at war with to face four thousand Iraqi police with Kalashnikovs
on the street comers. Since the police are carrying weapons, they all have to
be recognizable from a distance because you do not want nineteen or twenty-
year-old infantry soldiers to have to determine if somebody running toward
them is a hostile person or a police officer.
You are also not sure how well-trained the police are. You are not sure if
they are hostile. You are not sure if they are corrupt. You are not sure if they
are part of the problem in the community: perhaps they are actually the muscle
hiding behind legitimacy that allows criminal gangs to operate freely. Also,
it takes time to build up those relationships you need with people. It takes
awhile for the residents to believe that they have a safe and secure environ-
ment, that the security provided is in their best interest, and that the police are
not an extension of an occupational force.
Just as the police stations and courts were not operational in April, the one
modem prison in Baghdad had been destroyed as well. The prison was the
infamous political prison that was symbolic of the tyrannical nature of the
regime: Abu Ghraib. However, due to the location of Abu Ghraib and the
amount of structure still intact in April 2003, it remained the most ideal prison
to be reconstructed. The prison occupies an ideal piece of real estate because
it is a huge complex in a wide-open area. Something that size, with the
requisite setbacks to protect the structure, cannot fit in highly dense Baghdad.
Understandably, there is a symbolic consideration. Should the Coalition or
"4 Niko Price, Police Return to Work in Baghdad, ASSOCIATED PRESS ONLINE, May 4,2003,
2003 WL 20006977.
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new Iraqi government imprison people in the same facility that was known to
be a location of torture and summary executions? If the prison authorities did
not decide to rebuild Abu Ghraib, where were they going to detain the
prisoners in the meantime? There were no other large structures in which to
detain prisoners in April 2003. As it was, military police had to build
temporary detention facilities with tents until contractors could finish the first
phase of reconstruction of Abu Ghraib, repair smaller pre-trial jails within
Baghdad, and replace holding cells in the police precincts.
In May, the average temperature is 120 degrees Fahrenheit. Air condition-
ing was a luxury that few in Baghdad enjoyed during the summer of 2003. So
when the Coalition builds these interim camps for holding people in difficult
circumstances, it makes sense to use what permanent structures were presently
available to improve the conditions for the detainees, even if by a small
amount.
That was the situation in May 2003. Two courts were operating at minimal
capacity, there were limited police functions, and prison facilities needed
drastic improvements. Nevertheless, all three legs of the criminal justice stool
were holding up. So in June 2003, the JRAT started into its second phase:
support and interoperability. We wanted to open more courts, increase the
capacity of the system, and move criminal justice towards an Iraqi-managed
system rather than a Coalition-dependent operation.
In June 2003, the criminal courts, police, and prisons could not operate
independent of direct Coalition assistance. More criminal suspects were being
arrested than could be processed through the two courts. The temporary
solution for simple misdemeanor crimes was that the military police would
hold suspects in this class no longer than twenty-one days and then release
them. For felony cases, the JRAT would try to push them to the Iraqi
investigative courts.
However, you need to consider all the little details that come into play
when you are trying to marry two completely different systems and cultures.
Take, for example, an instance when military police are in a sector conducting
a patrol and they encounter a crime in progress whereupon they make an arrest.
First of all, only a negligible few military police speak Arabic. Personally, I
have never met an MP that spoke Arabic. While most military police stations
in Baghdad had translators at the precincts, the military police would ideally
want to gather witness statements. For the military police it was not easy to
even document the name of the witness. If the military police sergeant
conveys to the witness that he wants the witness to write his or her name down,
the witness most certainly is going to write it in Arabic. At best, the witness
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may attempt to transliterate the name into English, which is often very flawed
and incomprehensible. In the former Yugoslav republics, military police could
at least count on Croatian and Bosnian residents to write their name down in
letters that were recognizable to the soldiers. Even if the witness was Serbian,
Serbians are familiar enough with Latin letters to accurately transliterate their
names from Cyrillic. The soldier, in fact, probably would not be able to
pronounce Serbo-Croatian names any better than Arabic names, but at the very
least, could type the names into a computer database.
How does a military police soldier type an Arabic name into a computer?
How do you enter an Arabic name that, when written in Arabic, omits the short
vowels? It is not common knowledge that most Arabic scripts omit the
markings for short vowels. So take, for example, the very common name
Muhammad. In Arabic, the name is scribed with symbols represented in Latin
asM, H,M,D.
So even if a soldier was industrious enough to learn the Arabic script while
not speaking Arabic, the military police sergeant reading that piece of paper
would be able to decipher the letters, but would not be able to accurately infer
the proper vowels. And to imply the vowels by sound is not obvious either
because of local dialects and inflections, which is why in English a reader can
often see Muhammad or Mohammad. Mohammad is an easy name: not only
is it familiar but the consonants are familiar in sound. However, there are
Arabic consonants that do not have corresponding sounds in English and are
very "foreign." For the military police clerk inputting several hundred names
a day into a computer database, I assert that the margin of error for typing
transliteration of consonants, familiar and unfamiliar, with the rather larger
combinations of short and long vowels, is rather high.
To add to the degree of potential error, most Iraqis have four names as well
as a fifth tribal name. If the detainee is cooperative, they may provide the in-
processing sergeant their complete and accurate name. Many times the
detainee would provide the wrong name or only part of their name. For
someone with a name like Mohammad Abdul Aziz Al-Chaid, the person
searching the database is forced to best guess at how the in-processing sergeant
spelled this detainee's name. The potential different combinations for a search
query are impressive. In addition, the searcher presumes the detainee gave the
right name.
These are but a few examples of how, in June 2003, the JRAT was
concerned about interoperability. Detainees could be tracked internally by
their number; evidence and files held by the Coalition were tagged by number
and not by name. But Iraqis would often not know the detention number. Iraqi
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police and courts often could only provide a name so it became important for
the JRAT to work through these issues so the military police, Iraqi police,
courts, and prisons could all communicate and share information."
The process was far from smooth in the beginning, and I certainly do not
state that it was perfect by the time I left Iraq in December 2003. In fact, my
opinion is that many of these issues cannot be resolved until the Iraqis
themselves assume all administrative functions involving all three aspects of
the criminal justice system since the potential for miscommunication is always
prevalent.
Those are just the facts and I will let future generations decide on the
reasonableness of these hurdles. There are so many challenges to endure when
attempting to bring two completely different systems into harmony in an
operating environment immediately after the total collapse of a former
government and way of life. There were some tense moments with the Iraqi
judges that we worked with where we had some strong disagreements about
things. However, that does not mean that we had a bad relationship. On the
contrary, we all had the same goal. It took a lot of listening on both sides to
understand what was important to each of us. That is why it was so important
to bring the Iraqis into the process early and to work together to reach common
agreements and plans about how to solve these problems.
Despite the obstacles and mutual frustrations, all the courts in Baghdad
were operating largely independent of Coalition assistance by the time I left in
December 2003. There were significant improvements to the quality of the
cases. Most of the cases in April 2003 were documented on one page with
generic information. Through the summer, Coalition soldiers were much
better at providing detailed information. Each month, more cases were being
investigated by Iraqi investigators. The case files were thick, supported by
evidence, and detailed with the names and location of witnesses. Defense
attorneys had access to their clients. Military police turned control of the
police precincts back to the Iraqis and only retained periodic oversight of the
Iraqi operations.
My role from June until December 2003 was to assist the Iraqi judges and
investigators in running their own courts by providing Coalition support as
"s The JRAT routinely visited all courts to discuss problems and shortfalls with the Iraqi
judges and investigators. In August 2004, the JRAT also held weekly meetings with the Chief
Judges of the Courts of Appeal to identify issues, set goals, and report progress since the
previous meeting. Additionally, the JRAT placed bilingual Iraqi court liaison officers in each
of the courts to facilitate communication between the courts, military police, and Iraqi police,
and to include translations of court orders.
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requested. I feel confident that despite the challenges and obstacles we had,
the Iraqi judicial system is going to be one of the strong pillars of a democratic
Iraqi government, one that guarantees a safe and secure environment for its
own citizens.

